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ABSTRACT 
Advanced internet technologies providing services like e-mail, social networking, online banking, online 
shopping etc., have made day-to-day activities simple and convenient. Increasing dependency on the 
internet, convenience, and decreasing cost of electronic devices have resulted in frequent use of online 
services. However, increased indulgence over the internet has also accelerated the pace of digital crimes. 
The increase in number and complexity of digital crimes has caught the attention of forensic 
investigators. The Digital Investigators are faced with the challenge of gathering accurate digital 
evidence from as many sources as possible. In this paper, an attempt was made to recover digital 
evidence from a system’s RAM in the form of information about the most recent browsing session of the 
user. Four different applications were chosen and the experiment was conducted across two browsers. It 
was found that crucial information about the target user such as, user name, passwords, etc., was 
recoverable. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Digital forensics is a branch of forensic science encompassing the recovery and investigation of 
material found in digital devices, often in relation to computer crime [1]. It involves application 
of scientific methods within the regulations of law [2] [3]. At the most basic level, digital 
forensic is the process of acquiring, analyzing, and presenting the digital evidence [4]. Digital 
evidence is the information collected from digital media involved in crime, such as CDs, DVDs, 
flash drives, floppy disks, memory cards, mobile phones, network devices, RAM, etc., [2]. It is 
the basis upon which an assertion is established. Acquisition and Analysis of digital evidence 
has become an intensive area of research due to the increasing frequency of digital crimes 
across the world. 
For crime investigation, the data stored in target user‟s system is of great significance. These 
data can be either static or live. Static data is stored in static storage devices such as hard disk, 
CDs, flash drives, etc., whereas live data is stored in RAM [2]. Live data, unlike static, changes 
continuously but contains the current information about the system. Any application used in a 
system gets loaded into RAM for operation. So, the content of RAM holds the key to 
information about the applications used by the user on the target system. Valuable information 
which can be obtained from the RAM includes the processes running, ports opened, files 
opened for each process, user names and passwords of the user‟s accounts (created for different 
online applications and system log on), chat contents, e-mails, contacts, etc. Since the user 
names and passwords are recoverable, the investigator can log in to the respective accounts and 
collect more detailed information. A hit-and-trial method may be further adopted across 
multiple applications to check whether the same user name and password allows access or not. 
This enables the investigator to collect information from other online sources which had not 
been accessed on the target system. Thus, RAM is an important source for collection of live 
evidence in digital investigation and cannot be ignored. 
Simon and Slay were able to retrieve live data such as communication content, communication 
history, contacts, passwords, and encryption keys for the application Skype [5]. In this paper, 
the work by Simon and Slay is extended for more diverse internet applications such as social 
networking, net banking, and online train reservation systems. Besides widening the scope of 
applications, this paper also takes into consideration multiple browsers to provide a comparative 
study about how the choice of a browser impacts the amount of data retrieved. The objective of 
this work is to collect relevant information about the target user from a number of websites that 
may have been accessed in a particular browsing session. With increasing focus to unveil digital 
crimes, the approach discussed in this paper acts as a potential tool for gathering live evidence 
from the target user. 
The organization of the remaining portion of the paper is as follows. Section II describes briefly 
the basic concepts about Digital Forensic. In Section III, the adopted methodologies are 
described. In Section IV, the results of the analysis are discussed. Finally, conclusion and future 
work is discussed in section V. 
2. BACKGROUND 
The process involved in Digital Forensic is split into three main phases namely Acquisition, 
Analysis and Report. Acquisition (imaging) is the process of creating the forensic duplicate i.e., 
a bit by bit copy of the digital media under investigation [6] [2] [7]. The goal of this phase is to 
save digital information from all sources possible [8]. However, a step which logically precedes 
acquisition is identification of various sources of data. Analysis, the second phase, can be 
defined as the in-depth systematic search of evidence [1]. The third phase, Report, involves 
complete description of all the actions taken in the first two phases and the conclusion drawn 
from analysis, so that a proper documentation of the investigation process can be submitted to 
the court of law. Digital Evidence, being a collection of bits, is very sensitive and can be easily 
altered [9] [2]. Any scientific procedure adopted during investigation should make no changes 
to the evidence in order to ensure its admissibility in the court. In case of any alteration due to 
forensic procedures, a proper explanation must be provided [4]. 
Acquisition can be done in two ways: Static and Live. Static acquisition involves halting the 
target system and making a forensically valid copy, or image, of all attached storage media 
whereas live acquisition involves gathering data while the system is in operation. Static 
acquisition has certain demerits, such as the need to shut down the system, incomplete evidence 
and inability to access the static media if encrypted or locked. Live acquisition makes it possible 
to get a running picture of the system involving information about opened applications, files, 
ports, running processes, user names, passwords, encryption keys, etc.; where static acquisition 
fails. However, live acquisition has limitations such as need for administrator level of access, 
incorrect information from a compromised system, prior installation of hardware to be used 
such as Tribble and Firewire based devices, overwriting of some useful contents of RAM due to 
the software‟s own signature, inconsistent snapshots, and non-repeatable operations. The system 
state becomes a function of both user and investigator activities. In spite of such shortfalls, live 
acquisition cannot be avoided since it provides a plethora of information, which static 
acquisition cannot. Investigators should use softwares which cause as much less modification as 
possible because acquisition can be done only once though analysis of evidence is repeatable [6] 
[10]. Modifications can be accepted in critical situations as long as the investigator can clearly 
validate. Live acquisition is useful when the computer is on (or in standby or sleep mode or 
locked) and connected to a network [11]. As mentioned by Halderman et al. [12], in these 
situations RAM contents can be retrieved. But when the system is shut down, only static 
acquisition can be done. If the system is hibernated, the investigator can get RAM data by 
imaging the hard disk. Because after hibernation, the contents of RAM get stored in hard disk in 
a file called “hiberfil.sys”. This file can be copied and analyzed to obtain the RAM contents [4]. 
Imaging of RAM can be done using different tools as discussed by Davis in [13]. 
The analysis of acquired evidence can be done either through live response or static memory 
dump analysis. The first approach involves querying the system using API-style tools such as 
Pslist, ListDlls, Handle, Netstat, Fport, etc. The second approach is to gather useful data from 
the captured memory image in an isolated manner using different memory analysis tools such as 
volatility, hex editor and string extraction utilities [14]. Volatility provides command for 
determining the processes running, the dlls associated with each process, the files opened for 
each process, the list of opened sockets etc. Hex editor can be used for manual string search. 
String extraction utilities can be used to extract strings from RAM image which can then be 
analyzed manually. 
Report involves complete documentation of all processes and tools. It also summarizes the 
conclusions drawn in a layperson‟s terms [1]. Documentation cannot be considered to be an 
isolated or specific phase and should be done in every step of the investigation process in order 
to have a complete description of all steps involved and the results. The prepared document is 
used for verification and decision making in the court. This also helps a new investigator to 
understand the whole process quickly with less effort. Since only the investigator can know the 
evidence in raw level, the way of reporting is very crucial to ensure that others can understand 
the information from the report easily [9]. 
This was a brief description about the various steps involved in the digital forensic process. 
Following these steps, an attempt was made to recover and analyze useful information from 
browser based applications. Live acquisition was performed by collecting RAM images and 
analyzing them statically for evidence relevant to the applications used. The obtained 
information can act as a key to access the target user‟s profile in multiple sources and collect 
valuable information about the user‟s contact, messages exchanged, e-mails etc. In the 
following Section, the detailed procedure of our work is discussed. 
3. TESTING PROCEDURE 
The internet applications chosen for the testing were: Facebook, Gmail, IRCTC (Indian Railway 
Catering and Tourism Corporation Limited), and SBI (State Bank of India). The browsers 
chosen for the experiment were: Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome. The choice of the 
applications and the browsers was based on popularity and frequency of usage. Another 
important factor which helped in selection of applications was the importance of contained data. 
The aim here was to recover vital information about the target user by leveraging on the RAM 
content for the most recent browsing session. The testing was carried out individually on each 
of the applications considered for each of the browsers. 
3.1. Test Overview 
A fresh browsing session (after switching on the computer) was started with no remnant from 
previous sessions. The application to be tested was opened in the browser and access to internet 
was obtained by logging into Sonicwall (a firewall interface). The next step was to take images 
of RAM at different time intervals, trying to cover all critical points without losing any valuable 
data. During acquisition only the application at issue was opened, in order to avoid alteration of 
relevant memory contents by other applications. This may not be the case in a real life scenario. 
The target user might have used more than one application and there is a probability of one 
application overwriting another application‟s data. But the testing had to be done in an isolated 
manner, so as to check for all the probable data that can be retrieved from the application being 
tested. After acquiring, the images were analysed for contents specific to the application of 
concern. 
3.2. Environment Setup 
The system being used for testing was a Lenovo 0768 HBQ laptop with following 
specifications: 
 OS: Windows XP Professional, Service Pack 2 
 Processor: Intel Pentium Dual-Core Processor T2080 @ 1.73GHz 794MHz 
 Physical Memory: 512 MB 
 Hard Disk: 80 GB 
 Page file size: 0MB 
 Internet browser: Mozilla Firefox 6.0 and Google Chrome 19.0.1084.56 m 
The page file size was set as zero, in order to have all the contents in RAM, nothing being 
swapped out to the virtual memory, since the study involved taking image of only RAM. 
Settings were modified not to save history, where history includes: browsing history, download 
history, form history, search bar history, cookies, cache content, active logins, offline website 
data, site preferences, password, and temporary internet files. In Mozilla Firefox, this setting 
was achieved through private browsing. Permanent private browsing was selected in the privacy 
panel under options. In Google chrome, this setting was achieved by entering into incognito 
browsing mode. 
3.3. Acquisition 
For live memory acquisition, the tool „Nigilant32‟ [13] [15] was used. This tool need not be 
installed in the target machine, but can be run from CD or external USB drive. It is just an exe 
file which needs to be run and has a small footprint, using less than 1 MB in memory, when 
loaded [13]. It took only 45 seconds to image 512MB of RAM. Although another tool 
(FTKimager [16]), was also available, Nigilant32 was preferred due to faster response time. 
The steps followed in acquisition are: 
1. Turn the system on 
2. Take image of system memory-Img1.img  
3. Start the browser (Mozilla Firefox) 
4. Take image of system memory-Img2.img  
5. Log in to Sonicwall 
6. Take image of system memory-Img3.img  
7. Open the application(e.g. Gmail) and log in 
8. Take image of system memory-Img4.img  
9. Keep the system idle for 1 minute  
10. Take image of system memory-Img5.img  
11. Keep the system idle for 5 minutes  
12. Take image of system memory-Img6.img 
13. Log out from the application 
14. Take image of system memory-Img7.img 
15. Close the browser 
16. Take image of system memory-Img8.img 
17. Keep the system idle for 1 minute 
18. Take image of system memory-Img9.img 
19. Log out from Sonicwall 
20. Take image of system memory-Img10.img 
21. Keep the system idle for 2 minutes 
22. Take image of system memory-Img11.img 
23. Keep the system idle for 3 minutes 
24. Take image of system memory-Img12.img 
25. Keep the system idle for 5 minutes 
26. Take image of system memory-Img13.img 
27. Shut down the system 
The above sequence of steps was followed for each browser (Mozilla Firefox and Google 
Chrome) and all applications under test i.e., Facebook, Gmail, IRCTC, and SBI. 
3.4. Analysis 
In analysis phase, the images taken during acquisition were searched carefully to find 
information relevant to the application under concern. First, all strings were extracted from the 
images using Windows Sysinternals utility „Strings‟ [17] and stored in different text files for 
different images. Then the text files were searched to find subtle hints pointing to relevant 
information like username, password etc. These text files were also used in the plug-in „strings‟ 
of volatility [18] to know about the id of the processes, within which memory space, the strings 
were stored. The plug-in „strings‟ of volatility takes as input an image file and the text file with 
lines of the form <offset>:<string>, usually created by Sysinternals utility „Strings‟ for the same 
image, and creates a text file containing the corresponding process names (or id of the 
processes) and virtual addresses for the strings stored in the memory image [19]. The list of 
running processes while acquiring the image was generated using command „pslist‟ of volatility 
and the pid associated with the searched string was matched to find out the process name. 
The images can also be searched for strings using hex editor [20]. But the advantage of using 
Windows Sysinternals utility „Strings‟ is that the output text file contains only printable 
characters, not the non-printable ones. So it is easy and clear to search. 
4. RESULTS 
The primary data for search were user name and passwords, used for logging in to the 
applications. The results are summarised in Table 1. This table is followed by the detailed 
analyses with snapshots for individual applications. The user names and passwords are 
highlighted in each snapshot. 
Table 1 - Presence of Password 
Application 
RAM image 
Sonicwall Facebook Gmail IRCTC 
SBI(encry
pted) 
MF GC MF GC MF GC MF GC MF GC 
Img1 No No No No No No No No No No 
Img2 No No No No No No No No No No 
Img3 Yes Yes No No No No No No No No 
Img4 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Img5 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Img6 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Img7 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Img8 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Img9 Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Img10 No No No No No No No No No No 
Img11 No No No No No No No No No No 
Img12 No No No No No No No No No No 
Img13 No No No No No No No No No No 
MF: Mozilla Firefox, GC: Google Chrome 
4.1. Sonicwall 
4.1.1. Mozilla Firefox 
The user name and password for logging into sonicwall was found in images: Img3 through 
Img9. The instances were in the memory space of firefox.exe. In Figure 1, a snapshot of the text 
file img9.txt, created from Img9.img by „Strings‟ utility is given, which contains the url of the 
website, the session id, user name and password of the user. Img3 was acquired after logging 
into the interface and Img9, just before logging out. After logging out from Sonicwall, the 
firefox.exe process gets closed. So the contents were not found in the images acquired after that 
i.e. Img10-Img13. 
 
Figure 1. Snapshot of text file from Img9 taken for Sonicwall in Mozilla Firefox 
4.1.2. Google Chrome 
The findings under Google Chrome were similar to those under Mozilla Firefox. The contents 
of Sonicwall login page: url of the website, session id, user id and password were found in 
images: Img3 through Img9 i.e. after logging into the interface till logging out from it. The 
contents were not found in images acquired after log out i.e. Img10-Img13. In Figure 2, a 
snapshot created from img9.txt is given, which shows the content of the log in page loaded. The 
instances were in the memory space of chrome.exe and kernel process. The words preceding 
username and password, which can be used as keywords for search, were „uName‟ and „pass‟ 
respectively. These keywords were same for Mozilla Firefox too. 
It can therefore be concluded that it is possible to retrieve such important information until the 
user has not logged out of the interface. This remains constant across the two browsers. 
 Figure 2. Snapshot of text file from Img9 taken for Sonicwall in Google Chrome 
4.2. Facebook 
4.2.1. Mozilla Firefox 
After searching the images acquired for Facebook, it was found that the user name and 
password for log in were present in images: Img4 through Img9. The username and password 
were preceded by the words „email‟ and „pass‟ which can be used as keywords for search. 
As shown in Figure 3, the value set for user name is „ipsita.chinky@gmail.com‟ and for 
password is „who678%2C%3B‟. The actual password entered was „who678,;‟. It could be 
concluded that the special symbols were converted into corresponding ASCII hex values, 
resulting in „,‟ as „%2C‟ and „;‟ as „%3B‟. Hence while searching for passwords; care should be 
taken for the ASCII values stored. If the password contains letters from A-Z, a-z and numbers, 
no special characters, it could be easily identified. 
It was observed that the username and password were available after logging out from facebook 
(Img7.img) and also after closing the browser (Img8 and Img9). However, the username and 
password was not found in the further images (Img10-Img13). This can be attributed to the fact 
that, after logging out from Sonicwall, the internet access permission got aborted and the 
Firefox window used for showing the user status information for Sonicwall closed. So, the 
process Firefox terminated completely resulting in the absence of the relevant data in images 
Img10-Img13. 
Other useful information (except user name and password) like profile name, updates of the 
target user‟s friends etc. were also available for retrieval because the loaded pages were stored 
in RAM. The contents including user name and passwords were mostly in the memory space of 
firefox.exe and very few were in svchost.exe and kernel process. 
 Figure 3. Snapshot of text file from Img4 taken for Facebook in Mozilla Firefox 
4.2.2. Google Chrome 
The user name and password for log in were present in images: Img4 through Img6. This was 
unlike Mozilla Firefox where the details were found in images: Img4 through Img9. However, 
the keywords for username and password were same as Firefox: „email‟ and „pass‟. 
As shown in Figure 4, the value set for user name is „ipsita.chinky@gmail.com‟ and for 
password is „berham!19‟. The actual password entered was also „berham!19‟. So, unlike 
Mozilla Firefox, the special symbols were not converted into corresponding ASCII hex values. 
Other useful information (except user name and password) like profile name and profile id of 
the user, updates of the target user‟s friends shown in news feed, friend requests, messages 
received, notifications, contacts as shown in the friends list, etc were also available for retrieval 
because the loaded pages were stored in RAM. The contents including user name and passwords 
were available till logging out from Facebook (Img6.img). No information was available in 
further images (Img7-Img13). These contents were in the memory space of chrome.exe and 
kernel process. It was concluded that even though the chrome.exe process was still running, 
logging out of Facebook prohibited access to these contents and only the user-id was available. 
This brought out differences in information retrieval due to use of two different browsers. Each 
browser has separate settings and capabilities and hence, the information retrievable will vary 
from browser to browser for the same application. 
 Figure 4. Snapshot of text file from Img4 taken for Facebook in Google Chrome 
4.3. Gmail 
4.3.1. Mozilla Firefox 
The username and password were retrievable from Gmail in a similar fashion to facebook. The 
details were available in images Img4 through Img9.  The username and password were 
preceded by the words „GAUSR=mail‟ and „Passwd‟ which can be used as keywords for search. 
A string, „abc*%21123‟, very much similar to the entered password, „abc*!123‟, was obtained 
for Gmail (Figure 5). It was found in images Img4 through Img9. In the password string, the 
special character „!‟ was converted into its ASCII hex value „21‟. Thus, it was observed that if 
there were two hexadecimal digits after „%‟, the hexadecimal number should be converted to 
the associated special character. 
In addition to username and password, other information like inbox contents and contacts were 
found. After logging into the account, the first page loaded contains inbox contents and some 
contacts available for chat. This ensured that the most recent inbox content and frequently used 
contacts could be retrievable. Similar to Facebook, the contents for Gmail were found in RAM 
while being logged into Sonicwall and stored in the memory space of firefox.exe, svchost.exe 
and kernel process. 
 Figure 5. Snapshot of text file from Img4 taken for Gmail in Mozilla Firefox 
4.3.2. Google Chrome 
Even for Google Chrome, the username and password for Gmail were retrievable. The details 
were available in images Img4 through Img6, but not after that i.e. in the images Img7- Img13. 
The username and password were preceded by the words „Email‟ and „Passwd‟ which can be 
used as keywords for search. 
The password obtained for Gmail as in Figure 6, „awesome^&28‟, was same as the value 
entered in the log in page. Thus, it was observed that there was no conversion of special 
characters into corresponding ASCII hex values. 
In addition to username and password, other information like inbox contents and contacts were 
found. After logging into the account, the first page loaded contained inbox contents and some 
contacts available for chat. This ensured that the most recent inbox content and frequently used 
contacts could be retrievable. Similar to Facebook under Google chrome, the contents for Gmail 
were found in RAM while being logged into Gmail and were stored in the memory space of 
chrome.exe and kernel process. 
This case was similar to that of Facebook, wherein, the data retrievable differed for the two 
browsers. This further strengthens the assumption that each browser is different and exhibits 
different levels of security for the same applications. 
 Figure 6. Snapshot of text file from Img6 taken for Gmail 
4.4. IRCTC 
4.4.1. Mozilla Firefox 
For the application IRCTC, the user name and password were readily available and were found 
in images: Img4 through Img9. A snapshot highlighting the same is shown in Figure 7. The 
username and password were preceded by the words „userName‟ and „password‟ which can be 
used as keywords for easy search. Moreover, since there were no special characters used in the 
password, the password was available exactly without any encoding. The instances were in the 
memory space of firefox.exe and very few in that of svchost.exe and kernel process. 
 
Figure 7. Snapshot of text file from Img5 taken for IRCTC in Mozilla Firefox 
As explained for Gmail and Facebook, there were no presence of user name and password in 
images: Img10 through Img13 i.e., after logging out from Sonicwall. 
4.4.2. Google Chrome 
 
Figure 8. Snapshot of text file from Img5 taken for IRCTC in Google Chrome 
The user name and password were readily available as preceded by the keywords „userName‟ 
and „password‟ and were found in images: Img4 through Img9. A snapshot highlighting user 
name and password is shown in Figure 8. The instances were in the memory space of 
chrome.exe and kernel process. Unlike Gmail and Facebook under Google Chrome, user name 
and password were present in the memory images taken after logging out from IRCTC website 
i.e. Img7-Img9. However, similar to Gmail and Facebook, the details were not found in Img10 
through Img13 i.e., after logging out from Sonicwall. So the contents are recoverable until the 
process chrome.exe gets closed. 
Unlike, Gmail and Facebook, this case gave similar results for both the browsers just like it did 
for the case of Sonicwall. 
4.5. SBI 
4.5.1. Mozilla Firefox 
The same experimentation procedure was carried out for the internet banking site of State Bank 
of India. The password for logging into the application was not found in any of the memory 
images taken. The user name was seen as an isolated string, with no elements relating it to the 
log in page present nearby. On the contrary, the user name and password for Gmail, Facebook 
and IRCTC were near the website address. With no string related to the application page loaded 
and no preceding keywords to help in identification of the user name, it was difficult to identify 
the string as user name. However, the isolated string was in the memory space of Firefox.exe 
process, thereby opening up a possibility of association. But this is possible only when one 
application is opened. It will be a difficult task to figure this out if more than one application 
were used by the target user. 
Apart from the user name, other useful information available was: account number, name of the 
account holder, bank branch code, name and branch of the bank. These contents were present 
only in images: Img4 through Img9. In the memory images taken after that, only the name of 
the website „www.onlinesbi.com‟ was found. This shows that the online banking site is much 
better protected from acquisition as compared to the other websites. 
4.5.2. Google Chrome 
 
Figure 9. Snapshot of text file from Img4 taken for SBI in Google Chrome 
In contrast to the results obtained for State Bank of India website for Mozilla Firefox, in Google 
Chrome, contents of the login page such as user id and password (in encrypted form) were 
available in memory images Img4.img through Img7.img i.e. after logging into the website till 
closing the browser. The keywords preceding user id and password were „userName‟ and 
„password‟ respectively (Figure 9). The actual password entered was „pswd$%03‟, but the value 
stored in the variable password was „37f08c5d00de89cb3c26e50200ee7242‟ which was in 
encrypted form. In the locality of these contents, the url „www.onlinesbi.com‟ was present, 
which enabled us to associate these data with the online banking website of SBI.  
Apart from the user name, other useful information available was: account number, name of the 
account holder, bank branch code, name and branch of the bank. These contents were present in 
images: Img4 through Img7, in the memory space of chrome.exe and kernel process. In the 
memory images taken after that, only the name of the website „www.onlinesbi.com‟ was found. 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The approach followed in this paper is relevant to the existing global scenario where acquiring 
digital evidence holds primary importance in any investigation. Every browsing session of the 
target user leaves an imprint in the system memory and this has been exploited in this approach. 
It was possible to extract useful information from the memory images taken after the use of the 
application (without internet being severed). The application names or the words (different for 
different applications) preceding username and passwords, can be used as keywords for search. 
The information found out during analysis were username, password, list of contacts, mails, 
bank account number, name of the account holder etc. However, it was observed that the 
information was not available in the memory images taken after logging out of either the 
application for Gmail and Facebook (in Google Chrome) or the firewall (all other cases).  
This represents the case of Live Acquisition wherein plenty of information can be retrieved 
about the state of the system in the recent past. Despite some limitations of live acquisition, it is 
impossible to ignore the importance of the contents of RAM. The utility of the approach is 
definitely on the higher side and is likely to find applications in a number of cases. 
In this paper, two browsers are taken into consideration for conducting the experiments. The 
results obtained were different for different browsers in the case of Gmail and Facebook. The 
experiment can be extended to include more number of browsers to provide a more 
comprehensive conclusion to the results. Moreover, browsers are getting upgraded regularly and 
each version would have its own specific settings and features. The experiment can further 
include tests across various versions of every browser. This would ensure that the results are 
consistent across a number of versions of a number of browsers. Moreover, it would provide 
deep insights into the probability of retrieval of evidence irrespective of the browser and version 
the target user is using. 
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